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THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG:
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY+
DICK THORNBURGH*
My interest in Hong Kong dates back to the early 1980s when,
during my tenure as Governor of Pennsylvania, I traveled there
to help establish trade links between businesses in my state and
those in China and Hong Kong. During the Bush Administra-
tion, I returned to Hong Kong as Attorney General of the United
States. At that time, Hong Kong's transition, provided for in the
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration ("Joint Declaration"), was in
full swing. However, few people outside the colony were then
paying attention to the setbacks the Joint Declaration was already
experiencing. In 1994, I led a delegation of the International
Republican Institute, a part of the National Endowment for
Democracy, to conduct a study of the rule of law in Hong Kong,
the guarantees for its legal system in the Joint Declaration, and
the post-1997 prospects for the rule of law there.
Our report concluded that there had already been a steady
erosion in the prospects for the rule of law caused by Chinese
disregard of its commitments under the Joint Declaration. Since
our report, violations of the Joint Declaration have continued.
These include the conclusion of an agreement on the Court of
Final Appeal that contravenes the Joint Declaration, the appoint-
ment of a Provisional Legislature, and the recent repeal of civil
liberties and electoral laws. I regret to say that in the case of the
Court of Final Appeal - as well as in a little known agreement
to cap the number of directly-elected legislative seats at 20 - the
Chinese were assisted in their violation of the Joint Declaration
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by the British government.
I recently presented my views before the House Subcommittee
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs as a founding member of the
U.S. Committee for Hong Kong, a bipartisan organization formed
to support the guarantees Hong Kong's people were given for
autonomy, a democratically-elected legislature, the rule of law and
an independent judiciary, and a free market capitalist economy.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong will revert to the People's
Republic of China ("P.R.C." or "China"). Hong Kong's return to
Chinese rule was agreed to by China and Great Britain in the
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. In exchange for relinquishing
sovereignty over Hong Kong, including Hong Kong Island, the
Kowloon peninsula, and the New Territories, China made a set
a comprehensive promises to allow Hong Kong autonomy in all
but defense and foreign affairs, an elected legislature, an indepen-
dent judiciary, and a capitalist economy. This arrangement, which
Deng Xiaoping designated "one country, two systems," appeared
to ensure a bright future for Hong Kong's people, and gave the
international community great confidence in the future, and,
indeed, in China's ability to recognize the reasons for Hong
Kong's success. For even though Hong Kong was a colony, it was
a colony of Great Britain's, a country whose own long tradition
of the rule of law and parliamentary democracy provided a check
on arbitrary government.
As China has stepped up its attack on its commitments in the
Joint Declaration, some of China's defenders, including members
of the Provisional Legislature, have attempted to justify China's
actions by the shortcomings of British colonial rule. Allow me to
debunk that excuse once and for all. China's commitments in the
Joint Declaration are clear and unambiguous. They were
voluntarily undertaken in an international agreement registered at
the United Nations. No alleged defect in British rule can be used
to justify China's violations of its commitments to allow Hong
Kong autonomy, an executive accountable to an elected legislature,
an independent judiciary with the power of final adjudication,
comprehensive personal and political freedoms, and a free market
capitalist economy. Efforts to excuse China's string of broken
promises should be seen for what they are: a determination that
Hong Kong's people are not entitled to democracy, the rule of




RULE OF LA W
The most recent blow to Hong Kong's future delivered by the
P.R.C. occurred in January 1997 when the legal subgroup of the
Preparatory Committee, a P.R.C.-appointed body, recommended
that 25 ordinances not be adopted as laws of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region ("S.A.R.") in their current form.
This recommendation contravenes the Joint Declaration's
guarantee that Hong Kong's laws are to remain basically un-
changed.1 The legal subgroup's recommendations were subse-
quently adopted by the whole Preparatory Committee on
February 2 in Beijing. The entire package will now go to the
National People's Congress for likely final approval.
The Preparatory Committee recommended striking three
sections of the Bill of Rights Ordinance which deal with the
Ordinance's interpretation and its role in Hong Kong's common
law system. The provisions that the Preparatory Committee legal
subgroup proposes be struck:
(1) state the Ordinance's purpose to incorporate the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") into Hong Kong law [Section 2, clause 3];
(2) direct that legislation pre-dating the Ordinance which
is inconsistent with its provisions be repealed, while
prior legislation which can be construed as consistent
with the Ordinance, be so construed [Section 3]; and
(3) direct that where possible, domestic law should be
construed consistently with international treaty obliga-
tions [Section 4].
The Preparatory Committee legal subgroup claimed that these
provisions contravene the Basic Law-Hong Kong's so-called "mini-
constitution" passed by the National People's Congress in 1990.
These provisions do not violate the Basic Law. They simply
state the purpose of the Bill of Rights Ordinance - which is to
incorporate the ICCPR into Hong Kong law - as well as the
familiar common law principle that inconsistent pre-existing laws
are repealed, and others should be construed as consistent with the
Bill of Rights. Indeed, the first of these provisions could hardly
1 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., § 3(3), 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (cmnd. 9543).
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be inconsistent with the Basic Law since Article 39 of the Basic
Law itself incorporates the ICCPR into Hong Kong law. The
only purpose of these repeals would appear to be to undermine
the Bill of Rights which provides a source of authority for
protecting civil rights independent of the Basic Law.
The Preparatory Committee legal subgroup also recommended
repealing five electoral laws governing elections to Hong Kong's
Legislative Council ("Legco") (the geographical constituencies as
well as the functional constituencies), the Urban Council, the
Regional Council, and the District Boards. These election laws do
not contravene the Basic Law's substantive provisions in any way.
The Basic Law repeats the Joint Declaration's guarantee of an
elected legislature for Hong Kong. The Preparatory Committee's
purpose in repealing these laws is presumably to clear the way for
the newly-appointed Provisional Legislature to prepare new
electoral laws.
The Preparatory Committee legal subgroup also recommended
repealing the Societies Ordinance and the Public Order Ordi-
nance. Both these ordinances protect the freedoms of association,
assembly, procession, and demonstration, all of which are guaran-
teed by the Basic Law in Articles 27 and 39. The full Preparatory
Committee decided to repeal only amendments made to the
ordinances over the past few years designed to make them much
less restrictive. There is some debate over the effect of the full
Preparatory Committee's actions because under the common law,
it is not possible to repeal a part of an ordinance and leave the
rest intact. The repeal of these amendments may have left a
vacuum. In that event, it will be all the more important that the
business of regulating freedoms of association and assembly be
addressed by an elected, not an appointed, body.
A number of other ordinances that the Preparatory Commit-
tee recommended repealing will lapse of their own accord. Their
inclusion in the list of repealed recommendations may have been
intended to obfuscate the serious nature of the repeals of civil
liberties and electoral provisions.
The Preparatory Committee's attempt to strike certain laws on
the basis of their inconsistency with the Basic Law exposes one of
the most important, and least recognized, problems in the Hong
Kong transition: The potentially pernicious role of the Basic Law
itself. The Basic Law was provided for in the Joint Declaration
as a way to enact its provisions into local Hong Kong law, not to
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subvert the guarantees of the Joint Declaration itself.
In a major report in 1992, the International Commission of
Jurists ("ICJ") reported that "the Basic Law is inconsistent in
many important respects with the obligations accepted by the
P.R.C. by its signature and ratification of the Joint Declaration."2
The ICJ called on the P.R.C. to amend the Basic Law to conform
it to the Joint Declaration.
The ICJ identified fifteen Basic Law articles which are
inconsistent with the Joint Declaration. Among them are serious
deviations from the Joint Declaration in the treatment of the
jurisdiction and power of final adjudication of Hong Kong's
courts as well as the limitation of democratically-elected seats in
Hong Kong's post-1997 legislature to one-third.
The Basic Law created an enormous loophole in the Hong
Kong courts' jurisdiction by denying them the authority to hear
cases involving "acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs."
As the ICJ noted, "this goes beyond the exclusion of defense and
foreign affairs from the judicial power" of Hong Kong's courts by
"treating defense and foreign affairs as merely examples of
excluded 'acts of state.'" The Basic Law also assigns the power of
interpretation and invalidation of Hong Kong law to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress, rather than to the
Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong.
The ICJ also criticized the Basic Law's deviations from the
Joint Declaration's clear provision for an elected legislature for
Hong Kong. Article 68 of the Basic Law, read together with
Annex II of the Basic Law and a decision by the National People's
Congress, established that just one-third, 20 of 60, of the seats in
the post-handover legislature would be elected. The British
government, behind the scenes, acquiesced in this clear violation
of the Joint Declaration,3 despite its earlier view that the transi-
tion period between 1984 and 1997 should be used to "build up a
firmly based democratic administration in Hong Kong in the years
between now and 1997."
4
2 Countdown to 1997 Report of a Mission to Hong Kong, International
Commission of Jurists, 1992.
3 Martin C.M. Lee & Tom Boasberg, Broken Promises: Hong Kong Faces
1997, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1994, at 48.
4 Richard Luce, Minister of State with Special Responsibility for Hong
Kong, House of Commons Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, Hansar,
at 470 (December 5, 1984).
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In 1995, Great Britain and China made an agreement on the
establishment of a new Court of Final Appeal which also clearly
violates the Joint Declaration. Under the Joint Declaration, a new
high court for Hong Kong was to be composed of judges selected
by an independent commission. Judges from overseas common
law jurisdictions were to be allowed to join, continuing Hong
Kong's tradition of relying on expatriate judges trained in the
common law to fill out the bench. However, the deal agreed to
by both China and Great Britain limits the participation of
overseas common law judges to just one, and gives the Chief
Executive, appointed by China, an unprecedented role in judicial
selection.
Finally, China and Great Britain adopted the Basic Law's
statement of jurisdiction of Hong Kong's courts for the high
court, agreeing that the court would not be able to hear cases
involving "acts of state, such as defense and foreign affairs, et
cetera." As I set forth earlier, the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress is given the power to interpret this
jurisdictional statement, guaranteeing that Beijing will have the
final word on Hong Kong's courts' treatment of civil liberties, or
challenges to government power.
The Basic Law and the agreement on the Court of Final
Appeal constituted enormous setbacks to Hong Kong's autonomy.
The most serious setback of all, however, took place on December
21, when China reneged on its promise of an elected legislature,
by engineering the appointment of the Provisional Legislature.
The Provisional Legislature was chosen by the 400-member
Selection Committee, who were in turn chosen by the 150-
member Preparatory Committee appointed by Beijing and chaired
by China's foreign minister. The Provisional Legislature contin-
ues to meet in Shenzen in mainland China rather than face a
probable court challenge from Hong Kong's elected Legco.
Without a concerted effort to prevent it, the Provisional
Legislature will likely be used to revise Hong Kong's election laws
and Hong Kong's legal protections for civil liberties. There is
great concern in Hong Kong about how the Provisional Legisla-
ture will carry out the Basic Law's Article 23 which requires the
Hong Kong legislature to pass laws against "subversion against the
central people's government," theft of state secrets, and to prohibit
Hong Kong political organizations from establishing ties with
foreign political organizations. As the ICJ noted, these provisions
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would violate both the ICCPR and the Joint Declaration. The
prospect of new subversion laws, in violation of the Joint
Declaration, has caused particular anxiety in Hong Kong in the
wake of the sentencing of Wang Dan, the Tiananmen student
leader recently sentenced to jail for 11 years for attempting to
subvert the government. Wang's alleged subversive acts included
publishing articles in foreign publications - including, I believe,
The Christian Science Monitor - attempting to maintain contacts
with other dissidents, and taking a correspondence course from
the University of California at Berkeley.
Beijing's definition of theft of state secrets was demonstrated
by its treatment of reporter Xi Yang, a P.R.C. national who
reported for the Hong Kong paper Ming Pao. Xi was recently
released early from jail after being sentenced to 12 years in 1993
for publishing financial data that was soon to be made public
anyway.
The Provisional Legislature has been criticized by the
international community and by Governor Chris Patten, who
denounced it as having "no legitimacy, no credibility and no
authority." The U.S. called it "unnecessary and unjustified" since
there is no basis for a Provisional Legislature in the Joint
Declaration. The U.S. has also expressed its view that the
Provisional Legislature should have a limited tenure and mandate.
The Provisional Legislature includes 10 candidates who actually
lost their campaigns for election to the Legco in 1995. While the
Provisional Legislature includes a total of 33 members of the
elected Legco, their presence does not confer legitimacy on the
body. The willingness of some elected legislators to turn their
backs on the people who elected them by participating in an
illegitimate body may simply demonstrate that they feel they have
no alternative but to acquiesce to China's disregard of its commit-
ments to Hong Kong.
The issue of the Provisional Legislature touches on an
extremely important, but often overlooked, issue - the wishes
and attitudes of Hong Kong's people. At every opportunity,
Hong Kong's people have shown support for democratic institu-
tions, and for democratic candidates. In 1991, the first ever
democratic elections to the Legco, 17 of 18 seats went to pro-
democracy candidates. Fourteen of these seats were won by the
Democratic Party, the territory's largest party. In the 1995
elections for Municipal Councils, Democratic Party candidates
19971
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won three times as many seats as any other party. In 1995
elections for the Legco, pro-democracy candidates won 24 seats,
with 19 going to members of the Democratic Party.
Hong Kong's people do not support a role for the Provisional
Legislature in revising laws governing rights of assembly and
association. According to a poll conducted by the Hong Kong
Standard newspaper, almost two-thirds of Hong Kong's people
believe that the Public Order and Societies Ordinances should be
handled by the post-handover elected legislature, and oppose the
Preparatory Committee's recommendations reinstating repressive
colonial laws. A majority of 58.6% felt that the repeals an-
nounced by the Preparatory Committee would undermine human
rights-a clear rebuke to Chief Executive Tung Chee-wha, who has
called the proposed revisions "fair and reasonable." By accepting
appointment as Chief Executive, Mr. Tung has accepted the
responsibilities of running Hong Kong according to the terms of
the Joint Declaration. In the final analysis, Mr. Tung and his
government will bear the greatest responsibility for ensuring that
the Joint Declaration's guarantees for an elected legislature,
independent judiciary, capitalist economy, and personal freedoms
are met. This is not a promising beginning.
The U.S. Congress has made support for the Joint Declaration
the cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Hong Kong. The 1992
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act sets forth the policy of the
United States that it should support the full implementation of
the Joint Declaration, as well as democracy and human rights in
Hong Kong and the continuation and expansion of bilateral ties
between the United States and Hong Kong. The Act requires
annual reports on the Joint Declaration's implementation and
directs the President, after July 1, 1997, to determine whether
Hong Kong is "sufficiently autonomous to justify treatment under
a particular law of the United States, or any provision thereof,
different from that accorded the People's Republic of China." In
other words, if Hong Kong is not autonomous - as measured by
the "terms, obligations, and expectations expressed in the Joint
Declaration" - the President may suspend the application of that
law with respect to Hong Kong.
Reports submitted under the U.S. Hong Kong Policy Act have
been disappointing. In 1995, the Congress, citing "deficiencies" in
reports submitted under the Act, enacted specific reporting criteria
requiring "detailed information on the status of and other
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developments affecting, implementation of the Sino-British Joint
Declaration" including the Basic Law's consistency with the Joint
Declaration, the treatment of political parties, the independence
of the judiciary, and the Bill of Rights. Despite these specific
directives, the 1996 report failed to address the Basic Law's
inconsistencies and other violations of the Joint Declaration.
Subsequently, the Congress passed additional legislation requiring
that the 1997 report specifically address China's appointment of
a provisional legislature and the expected dissolution of the Legco.
The 1997 report, due March 31, will be the last report
required under the Act before reversion. I suggested to the
Subcommittee that it consider holding a comprehensive hearing
on this report in order to thoroughly examine not only the Joint
Declaration's implementation, but also the State Department's
treatment of the developments over the past year including the
appointment of the Provisional Legislature, the status of the Bill
of Rights Ordinance, and other laws affecting civil liberties, and
the treatment of political parties. The Department of State should
be put on notice in advance of this report that Congress expects
a full and complete accounting of developments over the past
year.
The State Department's reports under the U.S. Hong Kong
Policy Act reflect a much larger problem in U.S. policy toward
Hong Kong. The United States claims that it cannot identify
violations of the Joint Declaration because it is not a party to the
Joint Declaration. The official Administration position is that
"the United States does not offer legal interpretations of agree-
ments to which it is not a party"' and where the parties them-
selves have not stated their positions. The United States thus
claims, in effect, that it cannot conclude that the Joint Declara-
tion's provision for an elected legislature is violated by the
appointment of a provisional legislature because Great Britain
itself has not said so.
It is true that Great Britain has not taken the step of calling
the Provisional Legislature a violation of the Joint Declaration.
Instead, Britain has attempted to pursue a kind of two-track
policy, opposing the Provisional Legislature on "political" grounds
while refraining from drawing a legal conclusion about its
s Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord, Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, July 18, 1996.
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inconsistency with the Joint Declaration.
This is a specious position which the U.S. must reject
unequivocally. Great Britain's position, which is untenable in my
view, is irrelevant. Support for the Joint Declaration is a matter
of U.S. law. Even if U.S. law didn't link our policy to support
of the Joint Declaration, U.S. policy toward Hong Kong should
clearly be informed by China's compliance with the Joint
Declaration. The Administration position toward Hong Kong is
also shortsighted. U.S. interests in Hong Kong and Asia, from
trade to law enforcement, will be directly affected by whether the
Joint Declaration's broad guarantee of autonomy is respected by
China. The concept of autonomy cannot be separated from the
guarantees of an elected legislature, an independent judiciary, and
a capitalist economy. Any broken promise by China will make
Hong Kong's autonomy itself more fragile.
As a former Attorney General and prosecutor, I am particu-
larly concerned with the potentially devastating impact of official
corruption on Hong Kong. Hong Kong, after weathering a
difficult period in the 1970s, has earned a reputation for being one
of the cleanest and most honest governments in the world.
However, Hong Kong is already experiencing a marked increase
in complaints of corruption. The growing economic links
between Hong Kong and China have exposed Hong Kong
customs and immigration officials to greater opportunities for
corruption. While China has committed to establish an indepen-
dent anti-corruption commission after 1997, there are obvious
concerns about Beijing's commitment to an apolitical body such
as the current Independent Commission Against Corruption with
carefully circumscribed powers.
It would be a tragedy if, at a time when democracy and the
rule of law are gaining ground around the world, Hong Kong's
people, a great many of whom are refugees or descendants of
refugees from repression, were to be denied the future they were
promised. The United States simply must stand up for the people
of Hong Kong. As the strongest and most free nation in the
world, our leadership is crucial. It is more than a matter of
national interest, it is a matter of national honor.
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